What kinds of evidence reliably support predictions of effectiveness for health and social care interventions? There is increasing reliance, not only for healthcare policy and practice but for more general social and economic policy deliberation, on evidence that comes from studies whose basic logic is that of JS Mill's method of difference. These include randomized controlled trials (RCTs), case control studies, cohort studies, and some uses of causal Bayes nets and counterfactual-licensing models like ones commonly developed in econometrics. The topic of this paper is the 'external validity' of causal conclusions from these kinds of studies. We shall argue two claims. Claim, negative: external validity is the wrong idea; claim, positive:
Introduction
What kinds of evidence reliably support predictions of effectiveness for health and social-care interventions? There is increasing reliance on evidence that comes from studies whose basic logic is that of JS Mill's method of difference. These include randomized controlled trials (RCTs), case control studies, cohort studies, and some uses of causal Bayes nets and counterfactual-licensing models like ones commonly developed in econometrics. [1] , [2] and references therein discuss these methods further. The topic of this paper is the venerable issue of the 'external validity' of causal conclusions from these kinds of studies. We shall argue two claims. Claim, negative: external validity is the wrong idea; claim, positive: 'capacities' are almost always the right idea, if any idea is right.
If correct, these claims imply big problems for policy decisions. Often in making these decisions one hopes to rely on some solid Mill's-method-of-difference studies.
Indeed many advice guides for grading policy predictions give top grades to a proposed policy if two good Mill's-method-of difference studies support it. But if capacities are to support an effectiveness prediction from a method-of-difference study, much more evidence, and much different in kind, is required, and at two stages: First, to support the capacity claim; second to supplement this claim to ensure the capacity will operate in the target situation, and operate in the expected way. So a lot more work is required than hoped. To illustrate the complexities involved we consider Multisystemic Therapy (MST), an intervention internationally adopted to diminish antisocial behaviour in young people. Section 2 below explains Mill's method of difference, what it can establish, and why; section 3, some sufficient conditions for claims established by method-of-difference studies to be externally valid; section 4 introduces three kinds of causal claims; section 5 explains capacities and their logic; section 6 explains why reasoning with capacities requires different evidence than method-of-difference studies provide; and section 7 describes the discrepant findings of RCTs on Multisystemic Therapy and the current difficulties in deciding how to interpret these results.
Mill's Method-of-Difference Studies
Mill's method-of-difference studies locate differences in the probability of a selected outcome (O) with and without the treatment/intervention (T) across two groups that have identical distributions for all factors causally relevant to the outcome except those causally downstream from the treatment. The intent is to draw a causal conclusion. But for that, some assumptions must be made to connect causes with probabilities. The most standard one, which we shall suppose here, 1 ,is 1 There are other ways to draw this connection. Probably the other most dominant is that of Holland and Rubin [3] . This links method-of-difference studies to effectiveness predictions via singular counterfactuals. These two methods are closely connected however, which is apparent form the three decades old literature connecting probabilistic causality with the probability of counterfactual conditionals.
Causal Fixing (CF):
The probability of an effect is fixed by the values taken by a full set of its causes.
RCTs, case control studies, cohort studies, and some uses of causal Bayes nets and counterfactual-licensing models like ones commonly developed in econometrics all follow the method-of-difference logic. This logic is deductive. That is its special strength. Given CF, if a positive probabilistic difference obtains and if the two groups have identical distributions of other causal factors, it follows T causes O in some subpopulation, φ, of the population (X) of the individuals in the study that is causally homogeneous with respect to O. 2 The methods differ by how they try to match the distribution of other causes in the two groups and sometimes by the techniques used to infer probabilities from observed frequencies.
External Validity
We must be careful though. A positive difference between treatment and nontreatment groups shows that T causes O in some causally homogeneous subpopulation φ of X. This is a very narrow conclusion, of little use as it stands. Hence enters the venerable problem of external validity: When will the conclusion established for study population X hold for target population θ?
It is easy to provide sufficient conditions. T causes O in any new population θ in which both
i) The same causal laws for O hold as in X (so that the same factors will be causes of O as in X); 3 and ii) Some causally homogeneous subpopulation, φ, of X in which the probability of O is greater in the treatment than the non-treatment groups is a subpopulation of θ.
Not only are these conditions sufficient for T to cause O in θ. They are also necessary to justify exporting study results to θ. After all if θ has different causal laws or different subpopulations than those causally positive in X it may be true that T causes O there but whether it does so in X is irrelevant.
What if we back off though? Do not draw a causal conclusion; merely look at some probabilistic fact, for instance the effect size: the mean difference in O between the treatment and non-treatment groups in X. When will effect size be the same between X and θ? An answer requires assumptions about how the probability of O gets fixed.
The most reasonable one we know is CF. 4 Given CF, the following conditions are sufficient. The effect size is the same in θ as in X when i) X and θ are the same with respect to the causal laws for O; and ii) X and θ are the same with respect to the probability of all causally homogeneous subclasses.
Otherwise it is an accident of the numbers. 3 If this condition doesn't hold then it makes no difference if φ is a subpopulation of the new population since now φ is defined as a population in which some given set of factors all have the same values. But this is irrelevant if those factors are not the causal factors for O in the new population. 4 So it seems causality must enter at some stage of reasoning.
So, very restrictive conditions must be met for effect size to travel from study to target populations. These conditions are restrictive not only in the sense that they may not hold widely, but also with respect to the epistemic demands they make. RCTs are now taken as a gold standard in causal inference throughout healthcare and social policy worlds because they are supposed to best control for bias from unknown confounders.
So it is widely acknowledged that we generally don't know all the important causes for a factor, let alone knowing the distribution of subpopulations homogeneous with respect to these in the study and the target populations as ii) requires.
Nor is i) easier. Most causal and probabilistic relations relied on in healthcare and social practice are not fundamental: They do not just hold, they hold on account of some underlying structure that gives rise to them. When the structures are different, so too are the causal and probabilistic relations they create. For instance, stepping on the right-hand lever on the car floor -i.e., the throttle -causes the object the lever is attached to accelerate. Stepping on the lever attached to the end of a toaster produces something entirely different. In this example the underlying structures are mechanical.
In cases of interest for health and social policy they will be a mix of institutional, psychological and physical. The basic lesson is the same. Different underlying structures yield different causal and probabilistic relations. The problem is we often do not understand these underlying structures nor how they work to give rise to the causal relations an intervention might use. So we don't know when i) is satisfied. For some causal relations it may be good to assume, as one economist recently claimed, that people are much the same wheresoever they are; for others that assumption can be disastrous. So the demands for exporting effect size from study to target population are generally far too great.
A weaker conclusion concerns the direction of the effect size: When will a positive effect size in X be sufficient for a positive effect size in θ? A number of separately sufficient conditions are immediately apparent. Effect-size direction will be the same If T has same effect on every individual. Again, these are strong conditions that may often fail to obtain. Is there then no other kind of useful conclusion to be exported more widely? We believe there often is. To see what kind of conclusion that is we offer some simple distinctions among types of causal claims.
Three Kinds of Causal Claims
In order to understand the route from method-of-difference studies to effectiveness predictions it helps to distinguish three kinds of causal claims:
1. It-works-somewhere claims: T causes O somewhere under some conditions (e.g. in study population X, administered by method M).
Capacity claims:
T has a (relatively) stable capacity to promote O.
It-will-work-for-us claims: T would cause O in population θ administered as it
would be administered given policy P (i.e., effectiveness claims).
Given CF, method-of-difference studies can establish it-works-somewhere claims and medical and social sciences work hard to do so. 7 But what makes these evidence for effectiveness claims: T would cause O in θ administered as it would be administered given policy P (T will work for us)? The standard answer is external validity. An alternative is capacities.
Stable Capacities
'T has a stable capacity to promote O.' What does this mean? Cartwright provides a detailed answer in a number of places [5, 6] and there is currently a great deal of work by other authors on the related (possibly identical) notion of a causal power [7] [8] [9] [10] .
Rather than pursuing these details here some examples may suffice: Masses have a stable capacity to move other masses towards themselves; aspirins have a relatively stable capacity to relieve headaches. aspirins 'try' to relieve the headache or that the mass of the earth 'tries' to make the body fall, though of course no conscious effort is involved.
In reasoning about effectiveness we often assume that factors have stable capacities.
Consider for example the canonical explanation for the failure of the California classsize-reduction programme. [11] A well-conducted RCT in Tennessee established that small class sizes there improved reading scores: The study supported an it-workssomewhere claim. California reduced class sizes but reading scores did not improve.
The usual explanation is not that the Tennessee study was flawed; nor that it was irrelevant due to different structural features in California; nor that it was an entirely local interactive effect from which no further lessons could be drawn.
The canonical explanation points instead to the fact that California rolled out its programme over a short time. Suddenly class sizes were cut in half. Nevertheless a wealth of evidence of different kinds can clearly make specific capacity claims probable and when they are probable they are a powerful tool for predicting whether an intervention will work for us. What is observed in method-ofdifference studies will contribute to this evidence base but the history of mechanics should remind us that a lot more is necessary as well, even if we cannot lay out a recipe for what the required ingredients are. Nor should we be discouraged. There is a wealth of scientific successes where we have acquired just the kind of detailed knowledge necessary to bring together factors with different capacities to produce relatively predictable outcomes, from GPS systems to heart transplanting and prosthetic knees.
Capacities and Contexts
Establishing capacity claims then is difficult, far more difficult than establishing itworks-somewhere claims. This is in part because claims that a factor has a capacity to make a given contribution neither make sense nor are testable in isolation. 10 That's because there are a number of substantial implications that must be met if a capacity is to be ascribed to a factor. In particular, 'T has a stable capacity to promote O'
implies that there are facts of the matter about 10 Just consider precise claims about electromagnetic attraction and repulsion. This is never present on its own; gravitational attraction always acts as well. So these claims can only be properly tested by experiments on the motions of charged particles if we already know how to 'subtract away' the contributions of gravity.
RCT advocates like them because it seems no theory is required to do what they do -
but recall, what they do is to establish 'it-works-somewhere' claims.
Consider a case using everyday physics. We choose this because it is simple, well understood and does not involve subject-specific commitments in health and social care. Magnets have the capacity to lift objects. Claims about their attractive powers have passed far more than two good RCTs; they have centuries of study behind them. Finally, you need to know how all these factors combine to produce a result. Often in health care and social contexts simple additivity is assumed: Add a good thing and the results can only get better. But that doesn't work in even this familiar physics case.
We get so used to vector addition that we forget that it isn't simple scalar addition.
Add a magnetic acceleration of 42 ft/sec/sec to that of gravity's 32 ft/sec/sec and you won't necessarily get 74 ft/sec/sec.
Whether and to what extent the magnet will be effective in the target situation depends on the causal structure there. It will be hard to make even roughly accurate predictions without investigating that situation and making a reasonable assessment of what the overall outcome will be when the relevant factors operate together. And recognizing that knowledge is missing at every stage, be prepared to manage uncertainty.
The next section gives a child welfare example to illustrate what options may be overlooked when we rely on a restricted set of evidence, mostly of an it-workssomewhere kind, and ignore causal capacities, both the power they might provide for our reasoning and the problems they entail.
Multisystemic Therapy (MST)
A brief description of MST is:
MST posits that youth antisocial behaviour is multi-determined and linked with characteristics of the individual youth and his or her family, peer group, school, and community contexts…. MST interventions typically aim to improve caregiver discipline practices, enhance family affective relations, decrease youth association with deviant peers, increase youth association with prosocial peers, improve youth school or vocational performance, engage youth in prosocial recreational outlets, and develop an indigenous support network of extended family, neighbors, and friends to help caregivers achieve and maintain such changes. Specific treatment techniques used to facilitate gains are integrated from those therapies that have the most empirical support, including cognitive behavioral, behavioral, and the pragmatic family therapies.
[ 15] MST has been widely adopted in North America and Europe and subject to many RCTs. A systematic review for the Cochrane Collaboration identified thirteen studies as meeting the inclusion criteria for the review; it reported that the results of these studies vary. [16] Several studies found some positive outcomes for the young people treated but there is no consistency in which outcome variables show improvement; some show no improvement compared with standard intervention. A large study in Ontario, Canada where MST was offered to juvenile delinquents, found no significant difference in reconviction rates at three year follow-up. Similarly an RCT in Sweden involving 4 sites and 156 youths who met the diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder reports: 'There were no significant differences in treatment effects between the 2 groups. The lack of treatment effect did not appear to be caused by site differences or variations in program maturity.' [17] Can policy makers use these mixed findings? The positive studies appear to show that MST 'works somewhere' but how can policy makers decide whether it will work for them? Current debates about MST show it is difficult to resolve these problems using the concept of external validity.
Treatment Fidelity
One explanation for the inconsistent findings is that workers were not implementing the intervention correctly. The premise 'T causes O' is not falsified since these were not instances of T. This is offered in explanation of the poor results from the Canadian study: '[A]lthough the quality and quantity of adherence data are largely unknown, the site with apparently the worst adherence had the worst outcomes.' [18, p. 454] The MST group, however, emphasise the importance of treatment fidelity and offer a package of services to secure it. [19] The Swedish study made measuring treatment fidelity one of the key aims in order to test whether it explained outcomes. [20] But their fidelity scores did not differ significantly among the six MST teams. On two outcome measures, higher fidelity scores were significantly correlated with higher outcome scores but there was no significant difference on the remaining factors.
Therapists with high fidelity scores were compared with those with low scores. The results were mixed. On eight measures higher scores indicated more favourable outcomes, while for ten measures the effect sizes indicated a negative outcome for the group with the highest fidelity measure. [17, p. 557] A related claim is that as the programme becomes embedded workers become more expert at applying the intervention: Programme maturity improves outcomes. Again, the evidence on this is mixed. [18, p. 453 and 17, p. 557]
Weighing the Evidence
Since treatment fidelity and programme maturity fail to provide convincing explanations of the inconsistent results, the field seems confused about how to rate MST. Using the advice guides for grading policy predictions, top grades could be awarded to it because more than two good Mill's-method-of-difference studies support it. Unfortunately, more than two good studies don't. In the health and welfare 
Stable Capacities
Instead of some overall judgment that it will, or will not, work in new sites, can we identify stable capacities in MST instead? Capacities that because of site structure differences do not produce consistently positive results? There are some ready candidates for such a label. MST was developed using empirical research on key risk and protective factors for youth antisocial behaviour and incorporates empiricallybased treatments insofar as they exist, e.g. cognitive behavioural approaches, behavioural parent training. It has nine core treatment principles all of which have empirical support or are generally viewed as good practice, e.g. being positive and strength focused, present-focused, action-oriented and well-defined. On the whole, the debate on how to interpret the results still centres around trying to determine whether MST does or does not work, sometimes deteriorating to personal attacks on one's opponents which suggests the disputants are unsure how to progress the debate when the usual pathway of labelling an intervention as effective is blocked.
Conclusion
Evidence-based policy and evidence-based practice are highly valued in health and social care. The dominant view at present of what evidence is reliable gives greatest weight to evidence from RCTs. This, it has been argued, is insufficient to meet the needs of policy or practice decision makers. A properly conducted RCT provides evidence that the intervention works somewhere (i.e. in the trial). The decision maker, however, needs to estimate 'will it work for us?' In health and social care the underlying social and physical structures in which an intervention is devised cannot automatically be assumed to be comparable to target localities in causally relevant aspects (assuming we knew what these were). Differences in institutional, psychological and physical factors yield different causal and probabilistic relations.
Sweden and the U.S., for example, have radically different ways of conceptualising and responding to antisocial behaviour among young people. The examples cited of California class-size reduction and MST illustrate that we need much more information to jump from 'it works somewhere' to 'it will work for us'.
The concept of external validity is inadequate for the task since it assumes that the same facts observed in the study will occur in the target and this is rarely plausible in health and social care contexts. 
